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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines U.S. and Russian history and current policy debates to advance
understanding of: 1) the strategic cultures of these nations, particularly with respect to BMD
policies in the recent past; and 2) whether and how their strategic cultures and approaches
to BMD are changing and how that may affect future strategic BMD developments and the
status of the ABM Treaty. The development of BMD strategies, including policies concerning
the ABM Treaty, within thc framework of the Zitablished American and Russian strategic
cultures is studied, with due attention to the Soviet experience and legacy in the Russian case.
U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have changed significantly with the end of the Cold
War, but U.S. BMD priorities have been redefined to reflect a higher priority attached to
regional and theater-level defenses. It is apparent that the Soviet experience did have a
significant impact on Russian strategic culture. Faced with major changes in its international
status, domestic political-military arrangements, and scope of national security concerns,
Russian strategic culture is nonetheless moving beyond the old Soviet culture. Future
Russian policies regarding the transfer of BMD technology, sharing early warning data, and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines U.S. and Russian history and current policies debates to
advance understanding of: 1) the strategic cultures of these nations, particularly with
respect to BMD policies in the recent past; and 2) whether and how their strategic
cultures and approaches to BMD are changing and how that may affect future strategic
BMD developments and the status of the ABM Treaty.
Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept. Strategic culture refers to a
nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements
and particular ways of adapting to the security environment and solving problems with
respect to the threat or use of force. In short, it defines a set of patterns regarding a
nation's behavior on war and peace issues. It is derived from a nation's history,
geography and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns
of behavior of the influential voices, i.e., the political and military elites.
The concept of strategic culture should not be considered a comprehensive
explanation of a nation's strategy. It defines policy boundaries and assumptions, but
may not always determine concrete policy choices. It is simply another analytical tool
that may be of assistance in understanding the determinants and probable course of
national strategies. Issues as complex as national strategy require examination from
multiple, diverse perspectives if a deeper understanding is to be achieved.
This thesis first offers an assessment of U.S. and Russian strategic cultures. The
development of BMD strategies, including policies concerning the ABM Treaty, within
the framework of the established American and Russian strategic cultures is then
studied, with due attention to the Soviet experience and legacy in the Russian case.
Differences in the BMD development and deployment strategies can thus be elucidated.
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On this basis judgements regarding future prospects for the ABM Treaty and BMD
policies in both countries are offered.
U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed despite the
consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international environment. Rather,
as a result of the global changes traditional U.S. attitudes appear to have been reinforced.
On the other hand, Russian strategic culture is encountering a perception of
heightened insecurity on the regional level, which is resulting in an increasing reliance
on nuclear weapons to meet national security needs. This perception is reinforced by
the disintegration of the Russian economic infrastructure which traditionally supported
the military's requirements. In order to confront the increasingly intense competition for
economic resources and new technology, Russia may be forced to rely on Western aid
until Moscow considers itself relatively self-sufficient.
In assessing Russian strategic culture, it is apparent that the Soviet experience did
have significant impact. Faced with major changes in its international status, domestic
political-military arrangements, and scope of national security threats, Russian strategic
culture is nonetheless moving beyond the old Soviet culture.
If strategic BMD deployments beyond those allowed by the 1974 protocol to the
ABM Treaty are to be made, the ABM Treaty must be changed or abrogated. The
possible receptivity of Russia in various circumstances to amending the ABM Treaty to
permit various types of expanded deployments, including ground- or space-based,
remains highly dependent on the course of domestic politics in Russia. Some elite circles
in Russia, particularly supporters of Yeltsin in the scientific community, might be more
open to transferring BMD technology, sharing early warning data, and participating in
a global protective system. The current trend in Russian elite circles seems to be one of
growing caution about such cooperation with the United States.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle. Sun Tzu [Ref.12:p.181
To heed Sun Tzu's warning, many theories have been generated that
attempt to explain why particular nations, governments, and military
establishments operate in specific ways. The ability not only to explain previous
strategic choices but also to reach informed judgements about a country's
probable future behavior has become even more important with the advent of
nuclear weapons. Military, political and academic thinkers have developed
theories based on models, such as bureaucratic and institutional patterns of
interaction and decision-making, ideology, cultural factors, and systemic level
analysis. No one theory has yet been able to offer a complete explanation or
consistently reliable forecasts of a nation's strategy and actions.
This thesis is an effort to advance understanding of one aspect of the why,
namely: strategic culture, in the context of ballistic missile defense (BMD). This
thesis examines the United States and Russia to determine: 1) their strategic
cultures; 2) the basis of their BMD strategies in the recent past; and 3) whether
and how their strategic cultures and approaches to BMD are changing and how
that may affect future strategic BMD developments and the status of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
S ' m ... . | ° • • ~~~~~ ~~~I ml nm l m tl i m t m ln mwm m • a m
The following variables are addressed in this thesis: historical experiences
of war; a nation's definition of its role in international politics; decision-making
structures for policy definitions; BMD policy; defense budget trends; arms control;
and national security strategy.
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE
Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept. The concept was first
introduced in a 1977 RAND study on the USSR by Jack Snyder. Ken Booth
probably provides the most detailed definition of the concept. According to
Booth, strategic culture "refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns
of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the
environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force." In
short, it defines a set of patterns of and for a nation's behavior on war and peace
issues. It is derived from a nation's history, geography and political culture, and
represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most
influential voices, i.e., the political and military elites. [Ref.18:p.121]
Others have also addressed the issue of strategic culture. Colin Gray
regards it as "a pattern of national response to challenge that has worked
adequately in the past." [Ref.6:p.37] David Jones attributes some other elements
to the concept, such as: 1) synergy of the state's ethnic culture and history; 2)
social-economic and governmental-administrative systems and technology base;
and 3) the network of military-administrative institutions and patterns of military-
political interaction. [Ref.29:p.37] Obviously, the concept can be expanded to
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include many variables. Thuugh it is not advocated as a comprehensive
explanation of national behavior, the concept of strategic culture may be a useful
tool for clarifying anomalies discovered in other methods of strategic analysis.
The United States and Russia have undergone extraordinary yet
interdependent evolutionary changes auring this century in the realms of
technology, military capacity, political character, economics and societal
composition. As strategic culture is a dynamic concept, any changes should be
reflected in their respective BMD strategies. Ken Booth suggests that those factors
must be assessed "that are likely to lead to change in national strategic
styles .... Among such factors identified...the most important are as follows: the
failure of existing strategies, generational changes, major domestic upheavals,
technological revolutions, significant developments in the international
environment, and learning from others." [Ref.18:p.127] Accordingly, major
changes would be expected in both the American and Russian strategic cultures,
given the dramatic history of this century.
Ken Booth's supposition concerning changes in strategic culture, as noted
above, requires that analysis of each nation's strategic culture undergo at least
periodic review and updating in order to remain accurate and germane. As
already mentioned, strategic culture is a fluid concept with no clearly defined
boundaries. This leaves much room for argument pertaining to the actual
usefulness and reliability of such a concept. Its nebulousness carries the risk that
the concept will be used as a "catch-all" by those unable to wholly explain the
3
basis of a nation's strategy via other methods. These potential pitfalls demand
the prudent use of this concept in conjunction with other means of analysis if it
is to remain viable and credible.
The argument for the need of multiple methods in analysis is made by
Andrew Marshall. In an attempt to improve "intelligence forecasting of Soviet
military forces," Marshall examined several analytical models. [Ref.8:p.6] Multiple
methods used in conjunction allow asymmetries and similarities of national
strategies to be more intelligently identified, compared, explained and forecasted.
Marshall notes that "the comparison of simple number counts or the comparison
of the technology in individual weapons can be very misleading" when not put
into context with other factors. [Ref.8:p.16J Training, doctrine, tactics and strategic
culture exemplify these other factors. The strategic culture approach may prove
essential if the results of conventional methods of analysis are to be interpreted
as perceptively as possible.
Strategic culture studies are also useful because they call attention to the
dangers of ethnocentrism in strategic thought. [Ref.40] Students of strategic
affairs are cautioned not to project their standards and motives on others, and not
to assume that their national traditions are superior, since these assumptions may
lead to misunderstanding the intentions of others. Ethnocentrism may lead to
overlooking the significance of differences because of assumptions that both
parties view an issue in the same way. [Ref.44:pp.15-16]
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The concept of strategic culture should not be considered a comprehensive
explanation of a nation's strategy. It defines policy boundaries and assumptions,
but may not always determine concrete policy choices. It is simply another tool
that may be of assistance in understanding national strategies. Issues as complex
as national strategy require examination from multiple, diverse perspectives if a
deeper understanding is to be achieved.
B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
The pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles since the 1940s has
confirmed the Soviet theory of a "dialectic of arms development" in that the
development of offensive armaments has resulted in the near-concurrent
conception of defensive systems, i.e., ballistic missile defenses. [Ref.16:p.21] The
nature of each country's BMD systems is, however, very different not only
physically, but also in purpose. The concept of strategic culture may shed some
light on the origins of these differences. The knowledge gained from examining
the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures may, it is hoped, provide insights
regarding the past and potential future BMD strategies of these nations.
In view of the current political instability within Russia, innumerable
scenarios exist regarding Russia's possible future. This thesis assumes that the
integrity of the Russian state will be maintained.
One of the purposes of this thesis is to explore the extent to which strategic
culture can explain the development of the BMD strategies of the United States
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and Russia. To set the scene for a more detailed discussion in Chapter In of the
development of BMD strategies, a brief description of BMD follows.
A ballistic missile defense system is designed to defend a target from an
incoming ballistic missile attack. The missile or its warheads would be targeted
for interception during at least one of four basic flight phases: boost, post-boost,
mid-course and terminal. A BMD system consists of several components,
including radars, computerized targeting systems, interceptors, and command,
control and communication (C3). The system components could be ground-, air-,
sea-, or space-based, and either fixed or mobile. [Ref.11:pp.49-971 BMD against
strategic missiles and warheads is one element of active strategic defense.
Strategic defense encompasses both passive and active elements. Civil defense,
mobility, deception, and silo hardening are examples of passive defenses, while
BMD and air defense are typical of active strategic defenses.
A defense against ballistic missiles has been sought ever since Germany
launched its V-2 at England in World War II. During the Cold War from the late
1940s to 1989-1991, the Soviet Union and the United States conducted the most
extensive R&D programs in this endeavor. In late 1945 the U.S. Army Air Force
(USAAF) Scientific Advisory Group suggested a program to defend the United
States against V-2-type missiles, possibly by using nuclear-tipped homing rockets
"and some form of energy beam." [Ref.13:p.41 By March 1946 the USAAF had
contracted two BMTD projects--Project WIZARD and Project THUMPER (canceled
in 1948). In 1958 WIZARD became part of the NIKE-ZEUS ABM system. NIKE-
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ZEUS interceptors were equipped with nudear warheads. [Ref.13:pp.6-71 With
the development of the SAFEGUARD ABM system in 1969, interceptors have
been designed to use conventional warheads. No U.S. strategic BMD system is
currently deployed.
The Soviet Union's initial BMD systems were modifications of its air
defense systems. The GRIFFON surface-to-air missile (SAM) was deployed in
1962 in a BMD mode around Leningrad. This system was dismantled in 1964.
In 1963 the SA-5 SAM was deployed near Estonia, supposedly for missile defense,
and it was also dismantled shortly thereafter. By 1972 the Soviets had deployed
the GALOSH ABM system around Moscow. This system contained nuclear-
armed missiles designed for exoatmospheric interceptions. [Ref.17:pp.27-281 The
GALOSH system (subsequently modernized) remains in place.
Both countries have viewed BMD as part of their overall national strategies,
though their policies have differed at times as to the exact role of BMD. The
United States has generally viewed BMD as a separate part of its nuclear
deterrence strategy, while the USSR considered BMD integral to its overall
operational and damage-limitation strategy.
In 1972 the USSR and the United States signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I accords.
This treaty placed restrictions on strategic BMD deployment, while still allowing
R&D.
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The status of the ABM Treaty is being questioned and the need for a
strategic BMD system is being argued in some quarters, in view of the dramatic
changes in the international environment. These changes include the upheavals
in the former Soviet Union, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons technology, and the increasing potential for regional conflicts involving
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The question of whether the ABM Treaty
should be maintained, amended or abrogated is certain to be posed more sharply
in the future. Will more advanced strategic BMD development and deployment
be pursued by Russia and/or the United States? The concept of strategic culture
may identify policy determinants that could shed light on these questions.
Turning from introduction to analysis, this thesis first offers an assessment
of the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures. The review of Russian strategic culture
unavoidably raises the question of the extent to which Soviet strategic culture was
an extension of Russian culture. If this were the case, elements of pre-Soviet
Russian strategic culture might persist. In view of Booth's theories of change in
strategic culture, it is possible that the Soviet period uniquely affected Russian
culture to s-,me degree, creating a "hybrid" with enduring consequences. The
possibilities are addressed in Chapter II.
The development of BMD strategies within the framework of the
established American and Russian strategic cultures is then studied in Chapter lL.
In Chapter IV differences in the BMD development and deployment strategies are
elucidated, it is hoped, in light of the differernces in their respective strategic
8
cultures. Judgements regarding the future prospects for BMD in both countries
are offered in Chapter V, the conclusion.
9
II. U.S. AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the strategic cultures of the
United States and Russia. The first section is devoted to U.S. strategic culture.
U.S. strategic culture is examined using the following variables: historical
experiences of war; self-defined role in international politics; decision-making
structures for policy definitions; defense budget trends; arms control; and national
security strategy. A summary of U.S. strategic culture is provided at the end of
the section.
The second section of this chapter discusses Russian strategic culture
utilizing the same variables as above. One of the major questions is, to what
degree did the Soviet experience affect the traditional Russian culture? The
section concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the Soviet experience
appears to have affected Russian strategic culture.
A. U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE
How has the distinctive "American way" developed and pervaded the
nation's strategy? This section seeks to identify the characteristics and
determinants of American strategic culture. America's strategic culture is derived
from "geopolitical, historical, economic and other unique influences." Colin Gray
notes that U.S. strategic ideas and defense policy are debated and formed within
this context. [Ref6:p.361
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Five factors have contributed to the development of American strategic
culture: 1) continental insulation; 2) the remoteness of serious security dangers,
owing in part to the military weakness of immediate neighbors; 3) the experience
of taming a frontier of continental proportions; 4) enduring fundamentalist
religious beliefs; and 5) a national substructure of immigrants. [Ref.6:p.40] These
factors helped to form the American ethos. Escaping repression, immigrants came
to this continent intent on building a new country and a new and better life for
themselves and their children. Previous political, social, and religious constraints
were thrown off; unexplored land was conquered; and the New World was
seemingly isolated from European political struggles. The United States became
a safe haven.
The conviction evolved that the people who had fled European oppression
and power politics had already suffered enough and that it was now unthinkable
that they might suffer again in their new country. Gray also notes that Americans
have come to expect the condition of relative safety as a norm. [Ref.6:pp.56-57]
This condition was born of their newly won isolation and enhanced by its
continuity in security terms. The result is what might be called a relatively low
"tolerance of pain," in comparison with the sufferings of the Russians over the
centuries. Exemplary of these contrasting experiences is the loss of life in World
War II. With roughly equal populations in the United States and the USSR, the
U.S. fatalities amounted to about one-tenth of one percent or 260,000. Soviet
fatalities roughly equaled eleven percent of the population, or 20 million.
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[Ref.50:p.2181 In addition, most of the fatalities the United States has suffered in
war have occir red overseas. Even the costly U.S. Civil War, with approximately
620,000 military fatalities, does not even compare with the military and civilian
losses that Russia has endured within its own borders throughout history.
[Ref.59:p.854J
1. Historical Experiences of War
The development of the United States into a nation was a unique
experience compared to that of other countries, especially as far as the role of the
military was concerned. The seventeenth century colonial period was fraught
with violent struggles for personal survival and imperial expansion into the New
World. No centralized military force existed nor was one desired. As the
colonies developed, so too did their military potential. However, they never had
more than a fairly low capacity for self-defense, particularly against the Indians.
"With great strength but weak defenses, the colonies experienced warfare less in
terms of protection...than in terms of retribution, of retaliating against violence
already committed." [Ref.46:pp.212,-2131 Certain similarities to U.S. nuclear
strategy are apparent. That is, U.S. nuclear strategy has relied on threats of
nuclear retaliation to certain acts of aggression, while no effective defense against
nuclear weapons has been deployed; and efforts to develop such a defense have
been intermittent.
John Shy points out that almost every war in Europe in the seventeenth
and much of the eighteenth centuries also meant the extension of war into North
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America. The solution to the vulnerability, disruption and insecurity the colonists
felt began to be expressed in terms of definitive military action. Shy states, that
from the American point of view, the Seven Years War (1755-63), the
Revolutionary War (1775-83), and the War of 1812 (1812-1814) revealed a
remarkable pattern of early setbacks followed by military recovery, perseverance,
and ultimate victory. "In each the very existence of American society was seen
to be at stake." After the latter war the United States was essentially safe from
further European military intervention in its affairs. [ReL46:pp.214-215] The
United States was able to enter the next century, which some havc called the age
of free security, with an established set of military attitudes.
These attitudes included deep respect for the kind of military prowess
the new nation represented. But this was also mixed with the traditional colonial
anxiety about a strong, centralized military establishment. Another belief was
that the concept of military security could now be expressed in absolute terms.
No longer would the American society be at the mercy of the European powers.
The exceptional optimism felt about what could be accomplished, when necessary,
with American military force is also noteworthy. The international events of this
period with which the United States was involved, e.g., expansion into the Pacific
arena, only strengthened "the belief that military security was an absolute
value...and the American society had been granted it, presumably deserved it, and
ought to be able to keep it." [Ref.46:p.216] In general these beliefs seem to have
13
not only survived into the 20th century but also to have been reinforced by other
elements of the American experience, to be noted below.
2. Decision-Making Structures
Other important points concerning the development of the United States
as a nation and a state are pertinent in this regard. The colonists who came to the
New World in general wanted to leave behind the repressive regimes of Europe
and be able to practice religious freedoms and to freely seek new economic
opportunities. Therefore, a deep-rooted suspicion was held against the idea of
creating a new government and military based on highly, centralized principles.
The democratic governmental system established by the United States was built
upon the principles of compromise and consensus, with a separation of powers
and checks and balances, and was one in which the rule of law was paramount.
The belief within American society in the centrality of the law has been
assumed by many to be true as well in the international arena. This would help
explain the significance given to international agreements and arms-control
efforts, e.g., Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II. It might also
explain why this country, upon entering such agreements, strictly adheres to
them, e.g., the ABM Treaty. Other nations, however, are not necessarily so
scrupulous. The dismay and disbelief felt by the informed U.S. public when
another country violates such an agreement is evidence of the tendency to project
U.S. values onto other countries. This may account for the confusion and hostility
experienced when it is recognized that other countries do not behave as the
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United States does. The centrality of the law has also meant that the use of
military force must be justified as necessary and pursued for a legal purpose-for
example, human rights protection or national security requirements.
The aforementioned factors have led to the development of certain U.S.
strategic perceptions. Some of the traditional American strategic beliefs have been
identified as follows: 1) "good" causes triumph; 2) the United States can succeed
in anything it energetically pursues; 3) Americans cannot fail since they are God's
chosen people; and 4) the United States can outproduce any enemy in the
materials needed for victory. [ReL6:p.xiJ The moral and religious infusions are
very apparent, which is not surprising given that these were fundamental
principles of this country's conception.
3. National Security Strategy
Shy suggests that these optimistic attitudes have been reflected in U.S.
military doctrines over time. This has resulted in an implicit assumption that, if
the doctrine is followed, military success will be swift and complete. Noting that
the American national identity has become closely associated with military
prowess, the society has come to expect (and even to demand) success. No
flexibility has been allowed in societal, governmental or military thinking to be
able to accept and to surmount fundamental failure; only temporary setbacks are
tolerable. [Ref.46:pp.226,2281 This lack of experience in dealing with and
overcoming serious military failures will probably continue to have a lasting
impact on U.S. national security.
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The aptness of the above observations is demonstrated by the reaction
of the American society to the failure to meet military objectives in the Korean
War (and later in the Vietnam War). As Shy states, for the first time
disappointment and disgust, in addition to moral and political disapproval,
sparked the antiwdr movement's emotional outpourings. "Even the outrage of the
young [indicated the extent] they were taught to expect a smooth, cleaner
American military performance, and how little prepared they were to face the
prospect of failure; their expectations and standards for judging international
behavior [were] as inordinately high as those of a John Foster Dulles or a Lyndon
B. Johnson." Shy concludes that the effects of confessed failure may be felt, and
severely at that, for an extended period. [Ref.46:p.228] Indeed, Shy's somber
prediction seems to have been confirmed, as even today the justification
procedures and requirements for U.S. military action are still heavily debated.
Others have noted that general U.S. public attitudes toward nuclear
strategy and nuclear weapons were rather relaxed in the 1970s. This could be
attributed to the perception of a lessened risk of nuclear war caused by defense
budget limitations, arms-control efforts and nuclear strategies designed to reduce
U.S.-Soviet competition. [Ref.47:p.201
However, in the mid- to late-1970s a sense of uncertainty was growing
among U.S. strategists, policymakers and academics due to the scope and
intensity of Soviet strategic programs. Harold Brown, who was Secretary of
Defense in 1977-1981, observed that the Soviets were continuing in their strategic
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force expansion efforts despite arms control accords, e.g., SALT I and II. The
Soviets were the first to deploy MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs, and ABMs; to test
ASATs and Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS); and to MIRV
IRBMs. Leon Gour6 notes that the main U.S. concern was the realization that
American assumptions about Soviet intentions and defense policies were wrong,
i.e., mirror-image analysis could no longer be assumed to be accurate. [Ref.7:p.2]
Representative of how mirror-image analysis affected U.S. policy-making and led
to erroneous conclusions, is a 1968 statement to Congress by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara concerning the deployment of the NIKE-X ABM system. On
the premise of a Soviet desire to maintain a nuclear deterrent against the United
States, "...any attempt on our part to reduce their "Assured Destruction" capability
below what they might consider necessary to deter us would simply cause them
to respond with an offsetting increase in their offensive forces. It is precisely this
process of action and reaction upon which the arms race feeds, at great cost to
both sides and benefit to neither." [Ref.14:p.63]
The Soviet force buildup in the 1970s demonstrated that McNamara was
mistaken. Even though the United States had accepted the ABM Treaty and was
making no effort to reduce the USSR's "assured destruction" capability, the
Soviets were continuing to build more ICBMs and other intercontinental strike
systems. Many, but not all, in the United States finally comprehended that parity
in strategic offensive forces had not been accepted by the Soviets as had been
thought. [Ref.7:pp.1-2] It also meant the tenets of arms control and deterrence
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based on a model of mutual vulnerability to retaliatory attack-sometimes called
"mutual assured destruction" (MAD)-were not accepted.
Gray argues that the 1980s saw a decrease in America's self-confidence
with respect to U.S. nuclear strategy of the 1960s and 1970s. The American
strategic beliefs of the 1980s, as Gray presents them, are probably valid for the
1990s as well. As presented, they are: 1) nuclear wars cannot be "won"; 2) other
cultures will soon share U.S. ideas; 3) strategic defenses are not only ineffective,
but also endanger the United States by exacerbating the arms race; 4) Russian
leaders can be educated into more constructive modes of thought and policy;, 5)
the U.S. defense establishment is as much the enemy as the former Soviet Union's
defense establishment; and 6) for structural-societal reasons the United States is
and will remain superior in defense ideas and in defense technology. [Ref.6:p.xil
Upon examination of the above, one notes some sense of continuity with
America's traditional attitudes. Namely, America's military might is held in great
esteem, yet many Americans are still troubled by being required to field a large
military force. With the threats to U.S. national security seemingly remote and
the assertion that foreign nations value international law as Americans do,
Americans tend to project a more democratic and benign image upon the world
abroad than is objectively warranted.
4. Role of Informed Public
During the late 1970s and early 1980s a breakdown in domestic
consensus occurred in the United States concerning nuclear policies in Europe and
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the United States, e.g., deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles and
Pershing II ballistic missiles. The public which formed this consensus was not the
mass public, but rather former government and military officials, the upper
echelons of academia, politically involved interest groups and certain members
of the media. Harold Brown believed that the causes for this breakdown were:
1) the increased tensions in relations between the United States and the USSR, 2)
dimmed prospects for new arms-control agreements, e.g., failure of SALT II to be
ratified, and 3) a growing perception in the United States, Japan and Western
Europe that the Soviets were ahead in strategic nuclear forces, medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and conventional forces. [Ref.47:pp.19-21] Hence
President Jimmy Carter began a vigorous program (continued under President
Ronald Reagan) to build up the armed forces to once again protect this country's
national interests.
The development of U.S. strategic policy is subject to diverse forces.
Fritz Ermarth has proposed that U.S. strategic policy is a composite of behavior
occurring in three overlapping arenas: 1) operational and war planning; 2) system
and force acquisition; and, most importantly, 3) public debate. The result is a
"democratic" process of strategy-making which produces no clear-cut or definite
articulation of U.S. policy on particular issues. [Ref.23:p.142] The democratic
process--including changes of administration and legislative-executive
interactions--also complicates attempts to devise and adhere to a truly long-term
strategy.
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5. Strategic Policy-Making Process
Since the 1960s, the U.S. strategic policy-making process has been
influenced by some historical factors. First, the McNamara legacy has had a
lasting impact on the process. Defense leadership style under the direction of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara relied on managerial skills and
quantitative analysis rather than on strategic experience and qualitative attributes
(e.g., traditional military judgement and experience). [Ref.6:p.40] The U.S.
military voluntarily accepts and upholds a constitutional order with a civilian-
controlled establishment.
A second factor, Gray has argued, is the inability of the United States
to accept "nuclear war as war." The thought of nuclear war contradicts Western
democratic and moral values, and encourages instead an emphasis on pre-war
deterrence. [Ref6:p.40] Fritz Ermarth has also noted this point, stating that the
United States tries not to believe in the feasibility of victory in such a war,
considering the consequences of waging such operations. Therefore, in the
opinion of a widespread constituency in U.S. elite circles, defenses (such as BMD,
civil and air defenses) against nuclear war are unnecessary for a nation's survival
and in fact may be destabilizing. [Ref.23:p.144] Such defenses, some believe, may
destabilize the strategic situation by prompting a preemptive first-strike or by
further fueling the arms race. This view tends to reflect the rational-actor model
of thinking.
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The loss of strategic nuclear superiority is a third factor. This was,
however, accepted by U.S. elites with the hope that the Soviet Union's confidence
and sense of security would then increase, allowing the USSR to become a
satisfied, status quo-oriented power, rather than an expansionistic empire. The
fourth point follows therefrom. The United States has endorsed theories of
strategic stability which rationalized the loss of strategic superiority. The fifth
and final factor, Gray has suggested, is the American unwillingness to recognize
the USSR, and now Russia, as a unique adversary. [Ref.6:pp.40-41] This is again
evidence of the American tendency to ethnocentrism-that is, projecting U.S.
values and objectives onto others. An example of this ethnocentrism is provided
by Alain C. Enthoven and K Wayne Smith, U.S. defense officials under
McNamara, who wrote in 1971 as follows:
[If] deterrence is also the Soviet's objective (as the available evidence
has consistently and strongly suggested), we would expect them to
react in much the same way to any effort on our part to reduce the
effectiveness of their deterrent (or assured-destruction) capability
against us....In other words, any attempt on our part to reduce
damage to our society would put pressure on the Soviets to strive
for an offsetting improvement in their assured-destruction forces,
and vice versa....This "action-reaction" phenomenon is central to all
strategic force planning issues as well as to any theory of an arms
race. [Rei.60:pp.175-176]
Fritz Ermarth also points out ethnocentric weaknesses in U.S. strategic
culture such as the misperception (or the mistaken assumption) that the views of
the Russians are similar to, or at least converging towards, U.S. positions. One
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source of this misperception may have been the tendency in the post-World War
II period to view strategy as "an institutional and intellectual offspring of the
natural sciences that spawned modem weapons." [Ref.23:p.140] In other words,
U.S. policymakers naively, and perhaps unthinkingly, judged that the near-
simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, would mean
the development of the same strategies in the two major powers to acquire large
quantities of such weapons and delivery systems--a mistake of the first order.
Gray asserts that U.S. strategic culture is oriented towards problem
solving. It does not accept readily the idea of continuing conflict such as was part
of the Soviet ideology. [Ref.6:p.142] The idea that certain parties may not even
want to agree on an issue, e.g., the Yugoslav situation, is antithetical to the
American capitalist assumption that issues must be resolved in order for
commerce to prosper. American strategic thinking has tended to be based on
short-term goals. Strategic thinking, using Henry Kissinger's 1957 definition, is
the ability to relate power to political purpose. Overall, grand strategic thinking
is not widely practiced in major areas of U.S. defense planning, reflecting a
national shortcoming even before the nuclear age. [Ref.6:pp.45,481
In addition, "the constituency required to sustain a project rarely lasts
for more than two or three years." [Ref.45:p.66] Top level policymakers come and
go, constantly requiring to be briefed each time by civil servants that provide a
measure of continuity. Compared to the United States, the Soviet Union did not
have the same problems with program instability because of its politically
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supported long-term goals, centralized decision-making and incremental
technological advances. Of course, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the
political situation within Russia may show itself to be more unstable and thus
subject to problems in long-term planning and policy implementation similar to
(or worse than) those in the United States. American companies have worked at
developing dedicated, long-lived support for various projects. [Ref.45:pp.65-691
The ultimate approval still requires the compromise and consensus upon which
this government operates.
6. Conclusion
The U.S. language of war has made its focus not how to control people,
as was the case in the USSR, but how to conduct war to minimize U.S. casualties
and, notably, to avoid ground force action. [Ref.18:p.32] This tendency may have
been reinforced during the McNamara period. Robert Bathurst also supports
Gray's observation of America's tendency to rely on technical "fixes." He notes
(as does Shy) that the American approach to war is based on inundation,
prolonging the preparation for war and then massing superior forces--in short,
utilizing America's wealth and geographic isolation. Technological capabilities
are thus emphasized, whereas Moscow stresses its massive human resources and
their utilization capabilities (to include psychological warfare). [Ref.18:p.37] The
role of the civilian sector, or the "rear," during a war is rarely mentioned in U.S.
strategy, in contrast with Russian and Soviet traditions. [Ref.18:p.35]
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The combination of several of the above factors has created a largely
U.S. strategic concept, escalation control, within U.S. strategic culture. Factors
such as the emphasis on quantitative strategic analysis, the interest in moral
justification, the centrality of the law, and the relatively low threshold for
withstanding pain have all influenced the way the United States views war. A
prominent school of thought in the United States has even argued that war,
especially nuclear war, can be controlled and that other nations also see war in
this way. For this school of strategic analysis, the "process of escalation" is seen
as a process of political "bargaining." This concept implies that an agreement can
be reached to accept or deliver a set amount of punishment prior to war-
termination. Another influential school of thought rejects any concern with
operational and war-termination issues on the grounds that pre-war deterrence
will not fail and that the process of nuclear escalation cannot be controlled,
anyway. Both schools of thought are examples of a democratic, pluralistic and
commercial society's approach to international security affairs. Again, the United
States tends to project its views on others and to assume that they will be
accepted.
Some of the main characteristics and determinants of American strategic
culture are summarized in Table 2-1. This is by no means a complete assessment
of American strategic culture. Nevertheless, it should provide a framework
within which to examine the development of U.S. BMD strategy in the next
chapter.
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U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed despite
the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international environment.
Rather, as a result of the global changes traditional U.S. attitudes appear to have
been reinforced. For example, nearly every U.S. foreign policy statement
advocates the spread of democracy to all countries, assuming that all countries
want to be democratic just like the United States [Ref.51:p.1] Perhaps as a result
of America's pluralistic approach to issues, changes in U.S. strategic culture will
evolve slowly.
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Table 2-1 US. STRATEGIC CULTURE
"* Centrality of the rule of law in both domestic and international
affairs
"* Pluralistic decision-making process with frequent changes of
administrations resulting in short-term planning
"* Military voluntarily accepts and upholds constitutional order with
civilian rule
"* Participation of informed public in decision-making process
"• Condition of relative safety as a norm built upon U.S. geographical
isolation
"* Use of decisive military force and advanced technology to achieve
quick conflict resolution
"* Reliance on economic-technological superiority with little tolerance
for mistakes in strategic planning
"* High moral standards-use of force must be justified and pursued
for a legal and ethical purpose
"* Little experience of defeat in war, except for the Vietnam conflict
"• Belief that most countries want to be like the U.S. and accept the
international leadership role of the United States
"* National and international security issues placed on technical
problem-solving level
"* Begrudging support of military force requirements, unless a clear
and visible threat is present
"• Belief that victory must entail no more than modest casualties
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B. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
In examining Russian strategic culture one is struck by its sharp contrast
with American strategic culture. Whereas U.S. strategic culture appears to be
based upon "ideological" principles, such as constitutionalism and democratic
values, Russian strategic culture seems to have been largely forged by practical
necessities of geography and history. Understanding the effect of the Soviet
experience on Russian strategic culture is central to any attempts to explain
current Russian BMD policy goals.
Some of Russia's basic strategic cultural characteristics are rooted in its
history. The lack of natural borders has resulted in an expansionist perspective,
with the desire to keep the enemy as far away from Moscow as possible. The
wide open plains that symbolized new opportunities to Americans stand as a
constant reminder of Russia's vulnerability to invasion. Not only was most of
Russia invaded by the Mongols (1240-1480), but that extensive rule turned
Moscow eastward and caused Russia to lapse behind the mainstream of European
political and cultural development. [Ref.29:pp.38-39] In addition to its "defensive"
expansionistic propensity, Moscow also desired to obtain land more suitable for
agricultural pursuits and mineral extraction than that offered by frozen Siberia.
The Mongol period is also significant for witnessing the initial unification
of the Russian state and the rise of Moscow as its historical capital. The
consolidation of Russian power and control that ensued both internally and
externally through the following centuries eventually resulted in a strong,
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centralized government. In order to strengthen the central government and
further reduce the power of the former principalities a standing army was formed
and became a permanent feature of the Russian state. The government was
controlled by the imperial family and favored members of the aristocracy with
little participation on the national level by the general populace.
1. Historical Experiences of War
The wars during Russia's imperial age helped to establish it as a major
force to be reckoned with in Europe, Asia and the Near East. Concurrently, the
Russian government was attempting to maintain internal control, a monumental
effort owing to the harsh climate conditions and the lack of any efficient
transportation infrastructure. Russia is faced with this situation even today.
The consequence of turning eastward during the Mongol rule was that
Russia fell behind in not only its political development but also in its
technological development. While Europe entered the Industrial Revolution,
Russia still struggled with its medieval vestiges, despite the earlier attempts by
Peter the Great and others to drag xenophobic Russia into the West. The result
was that while Europe rapidly urbanized and industrialized, Russia remained
largely rural and agrarian. While European military weaponry and tactics
modernized at an unprecedented rate, Russia fell further behind and lacked the
necessary industrial support. In order to overcome these shortcomings of
technology, transportation, and infrastructure, the Russian military became very
manpower-intensive and had to be forward-deployed to a significant extent.
28
These shortcomings also obliged the government to rely heavily upon diplomatic
and intelligence endeavors to provide adequate warning of imminent hostilities,
if they could not be averted.
The arrival of the Soviet system brought about the interaction of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, on one hand, and the strategic realities of the
geographical and political entity, the Russian empire, on the other. Once Stalin
announced his plan for "Socialism in One Country," traditional patterns of
Russian social, political and administrative behavior were able to reemerge but
under the guise of socialism. [Ref.29:.p.351 Though this was reluctantly admitted,
Soviet military planning relied heavily on Russian imperialist thinkers.
The Soviet revolution did bring about the breakdown of the old social
order. With the goal of building a new socialist state, the general population was
offered new opportunities that had not been available to it before, such as:
political careers, industrial management, higher educations, and diverse military
positions. [Ref.29:p.42] Although the Soviet system did develop its own class
divisions, social mobility (indisputably at a high cost) was afforded to many that
might not otherwise have had the opportunity. To an extent unknown before, the
overall technological and educational level of the populace was raised, aiding the
USSR's efforts to further develop its military-industrial sectors.
Soviet ideology justified the maintenance of very large armed forces on
various grounds, including the need to be able to spread the "revolution"
whenever possible. The result was that, to a remarkable degree, the entire society
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within the USSR was militarized. [Ref.9:pp.34-51] Here is a tundamental change
from Russian strategic culture. It is consistent with Booth's theory of change in
strategic culture, because it reflects a major change in domestic political
arrangements.
The high level of militarization obtained under Soviet rule was not only
for protection against external threats but also for security against internal
disorder. Soviet military and paramilitary organizations were a source of
immense pride and were present even at the children's level. The Soviet
government used the institutions as tools for creating societal norms and
promoting national integration. [ReL6:p.751 All major reforms were introduced
by the Russian state as a result of military necessity. For example, Peter the Great
used new military schools to Westernize the gentry in order to modernize his
military forces. The Russian state has been the primary agent in initiating social,
economic and technological change. [Ref.29:pp.40-41] The impact of the Soviet
era's militarization of social institutions, including the prominence of military and
paramilitary organizations, on Russian strategic culture can be expected to endure
in the years to come. However, the "myth" of the military has been broken along
with that of the Communist Party of the S niet Union (CPSU) and the military
no longer enjoys the prestige and admiration it once knew.
The vast expanse of the country and the poor communication network
required the forward deployment of the Soviet armed forces. These forces had
to be highly mobile and designed for offensive operations in many operating
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theaters. The Russian soldier thinks in terms of expanses of time and space, to
a degree unknown in Western militaries. This thinking provided that if Soviet
forces did not succeed at that moment, a new opportunity would emerge at some
later time. The Marxist-Leninist ideology reinforced the traditional Russian notion
that time and space were on Moscow's side. [ReL29:pp.45-461
2. The Soviet Experience
A higtdy centralized government, not subject to effective voter
constituencies, is able to more easily develop a long-term, stable military strategy
than a democracy subject to shifts in popular moods and changes in leadership.
In developing its strategy, the USSR had to take into account some beliefs it
inherited from Russian history. These beliefs include:
[First,]...crises and wars happen and...war can involve the issue of
political and social survival... [Second,] an official ideology that
precludes the long-term possibility of recognizing the legitimate
interests of antagonistic social systems... [Third,] for the first time
since 1917,...[the USSR was] not in a condition of unmistakable
military inferiority vis-a-vis plausible (by Soviet reasoning)
enemies... [Finally, the USSR was] subject to no known, noteworthy
domestic political constraints on its foreign policy
behavior,... [though] the pro-defense coalition... [had] to be "on-board"
for major foreign policy ventures. [Ref.7:p.55]
Gray states that the Soviet defense establishment's purpose was to
defend the Socialist heartland, deter adventurism by desperate capitalists or errant
socialists, and seek victory. [Ref.7:p.56] To meet these goals the USSR required
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power. The power was to be in the form of the military, upon which rested the
domestic political legitimacy supposedly defined by the ideology.
The ideology also provided solid guidelines for the Soviet national
strategy. Because of the Soviet ideology, the USSR could not accept the Western
concept of stability between East and West. [Ref6:p.1431 The Soviet world view
required the rewriting of history to show a continual struggle in keeping with the
Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviet idea of progression towards stability (i.e.,
world communism) required the defeat of the existing order. The Soviet language
of war did not begin, as in the United States, with a breach of legality nor end
with military defeat. It began with the exacerbation of class warfare and ended
with the transformation of society. [Ref.18:p.311
The USSR was not committed to maintaining international order but to
guarding the process of transition from the present order to socialism. [Ref.6:p.20]
The end result was a different way of looking at the force structure requirements
and the role of nuclear weapons. William Odom contends that the Soviets looked
at political needs, then at the technological capabilities available and the potential
strengths of adversaries, including the United States. [Ref.34:p.131] Gour6 adds
that the Soviet development of defense policy was not the result of an action-
reaction process with the United States as thought by many U.S. policymakers.
Rather, it was made upon a supposedly scientific base of Marxist-Leninist tenets
which incorporated available technological capabilities. The USSR attempted to
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anticipate not only its own military needs but also potential changes in the
policies, doctrines, strategies and capabilities of potential opponents. [Ref.7:p.4]
3. National Security Strategy
A body of Marxist-Leninist thought concerning both military science and
doctrine was ingrained into both the Soviet officer corps and the party leadership.
[Ref.34:p.1161 This common point of reference between the political and military
establishments provided a mechanism for promoting unity in effort which was
probably effective in the early decades of the USSR, and much less so in the 1970s
and 1980s. The new post-Soviet Russia has yet to define agreed ideological
foundations for unity in national security policy efforts.
The Soviet body of thought also gave the military and political
leadership a system to deal with practical military problems such as the kinds and
numbers of weapons and forces to be used. This led to the growth of "tough-
minded, empirically-grounded, military professionalism," which is still in
existence today. [Ref.34:p.1161 The primacy of military forces in Soviet economic
development should be kept in mind since many of the institutional structures
have not yet changed. [Ref.34:p.1181
The principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology encouraged Soviet leaders
to believe in victory, even in nuclear war. The USSR could not deprive nuclear
war of strategic meaning or else it would have meant that the most basic
processes of history (thus the basis of Soviet ideology and political legitimacy)
could be derailed by technology and a whim of an "historically doomed
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opponent." [Ref.23:p.144] The Soviet dialectic could never allow the country to
rest, implying a constant struggle until the achievement of victory throughout the
world for communism. This led to a concept of fluid borders, frequent wars, and
ever-changing definitions. Stability in the Western sense was never possible.
[Ref.18:p.45]
"Enemies [were] inherent in the language of Soviet politics and [were] one
of the dynamics of Soviet society" because the dangers posed by "enemies"
provided the means to mobilize the people, organize the military, and construct
the economy to support the military. [Ref.18:p.29] Russia still considers itself
surrounded by potential enemies, but these have had to be redefined on a new
ideological basis, owing to the failure of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Because
it no longer has to call for a continual revolution, Russia might be amenable to
accepting the Western concept of strategic stability. However, Russia is no longer
faced with just the United States, Britain, France, and China as nuclear powers
and potential adversaries. The Cold War "balance" has been altered by the
retention (at least for a time) of nuclear weapons in other former Soviet republics
(Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and the acquisition of nuclear and missile
technologies by Third World neighbors which Russia must also deal with.
Gray has suggested that the Soviets might have started a war not
because of a "window of opportunity" but rather for fear for the political integrity
of the Soviet empire. [Ref.6:p.88] Gray adds that a "careful study of Soviet
phenomena suggests very strongly that the most deterring prospect in Soviet eyes
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[was] the anticipation of military defeat" which would have threatened the
government's ability to sustain political control at home. [Ref.6:p.1131 The USSR
was already in a continual state of war-like levels of social mobilization and the
people had long since developed a sort of siege mentality. Some observers hold
that the USSR's main concern was for Russia and the extension, through the
migration of ethnic Russians and the policy of Russification, of Russia into the
other republics. Others argue that the primary concern of the USSR was the
survival and comfort of those in power. In 1991-1992, Moscow was willing to
allow the other republics independence as long as the Russian state's integrity
was maintained, thus allowing those in power to be retained. If this had been
threatened, a war might have been possible.
4. Decision-Making Structures
The over 70 years of Soviet military activity produced a pattern. Military
and political leaders recognized that the USSR's military capabilities were limited
by objective conditions. William Odom summarizes the fo'lowing conditions: 1)
a manpower base with a low technical-cultural level; 2) an industrial base
inadequate for modem technology and weapons, both qualitatively and
quantitatively; and 3) the emergence of several new technologies changing the
nature of modem weapons, which could lead to a new military doctrine.
[Ref.34:p.118] The fall of the Soviet Union will undoubtedly have little effect on
the last condition. However, if they could be achieved (which is debatable at
present), improvements in the first two conditions would have a significant
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impact on Russian strategic culture, especially in the areas of defense, political
structure, and international standing.
In the USSR the power was dearly held by the KGB, the Armed Forces,
the military-industrial complex, the state bureaucracy and the Communist Party
apparatus. Except for the demise of the Communist Party and the renaming of
some organizations, the old Soviet structures and elites were essentially still in
place in the new Russia as of 1992. [Ref.39.p.1] However, these institutions grew
accustomed to great autonomy and, for the most part, unlimited budget support
within the Soviet regime, and now the central supervision provided by the
Communist Party is no longer existent. The military and internal security
institutions do not feel the same degree of obligation to defer to the new central
civilian leadership nor do they desire civil disorder.
Moscow does not appear to have the same unquestioned centralized
control, as during the Soviet period, because power is becoming more diffused
to regional authorities. This could lead to confused or divided allegiances on the
part of the military and other security services if an internal crisis were to erupt.
Moscow may be forced to reconfigure its domestic political structure if such
developments continue in order to preserve its historical status as the center of
government in Russia. The impact of such changes on Russian strategic culture,
though indeterminant, would be significant.
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5. Conclusion
Though by no means a complete assessment, some of the main
characteristics and determinants of Russian strategic culture are outlined in Table
2-2 This should at least provide a framework within which to examine the
development of Russian BMD strategy in the next chapter.
Russian strategic culture is encountering a perception of heightened
insecurity on the regional level, which is resulting in an increasing reliance on
nuclear weapons to meet national security needs. This perception is reinforced
by the disintegration of the Russian economic infrastructure which traditionally
supported the military's requirements. In order to confront the increasingly
intense competition for economic resources and new technology, Russia may be
forced to rely on Western aid until Moscow considers itself relatively self-
sufficient. The role of the informed public in the strategic decision-making
process remains limited. However, as non-traditional demands upon the
government continue, the public's influence may grow.
In assessing Russian strategic culture, it is apparent that the Soviet
experience did have significant impact. Faced with major changes in its
international status, domestic political-military arrangements, and scope of
national security threats, Russian strategic culture is nonetheless moving beyond
the old Soviet culture.
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Table 2-2 RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
"* No equivalent to the U.S. preoccupation with the rule of law and
constitutional order
"* Centrdlized government
"* Military desire for internal stability, given non-Russian borderlands
under Moscow's control
"* International prestige and superpower status consistently
sought via military means
"* Underdeveloped lines of communication requiring semi-
autonomous, forward military deployments
"* Militarization of society retains preparedness of the "rear" for
military operations-both internal and abroad
"* Military/Political dominance of strategy-making-continued
importance of warfighting, war-winning and damage-limitation
capabilities
"* Enemies remain inherent; xenophobia persists with fear of (further)
loss of territory and internal fragmentation
"* Population will sacrifice for the state
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III. BMD POLICY DEVELOPMENT
This chapter examines the historical development of U.S. and Russian BMD
policy within the context of their respective strategic cultures as defined in the
previous chapter. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first focuses on
U.S. BMD policy, while the second discusses the evolution of Russian BMD
policy. Each section concludes with its findings.
A. U.S. BMD POLICY
This section examines the development of U.S. BMD policy within the
context of U.S. strategic culture. As U.S. BMD policy developed, it may have
been influenced by one or more of the strategic cultural determinants identified
in the previous chapter. The extent that these determinants may have affected the
development of U.S. BMD policy is assessed.
1. Background
Since Germany launched its V-2s in 1944, the United States has sought
defenses against missiles. The pursuit of such defenses has been affected by very
diverse factors, from governmental organization to compliance with nuclear
strategy and from public opinion to technological feasibility. Consequently, BMD
strategy has led a turbulent life within the United States. Not until the mid-1950s,
after the USSR had demonstrated the extent of its nuclear and missile capability,
did the United States begin a serious effort in BMD development. However, this
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initial decision to pursue ABM systems was not so much the result of a national
strategy as it was the product of inter-service rivalry, especially between the U.S.
Army and the fledgling U.S. Air Force, competing over funding and roles and
missions. [Ref.13:pp.11-141 The development of a strategy for ballistic missile
defenses since then has depended heavily on the prevailing nuclear strategy.
One of the major effects of the development of intercontinental ballistic
missiles was that the United States was no longer guaranteed the ability to stand
aloof from wars in Europe and Asia. In fact, as the only nuclear power at the end
of World War II, the United States chose to guarantee its involvement in virtually
any future war in Europe, especially after the establishment of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). U.S. BMD policy was to be heavily influenced by
European alliance considerations. [Ref.17:pp.5-6] NATO was an "entangling
alliance" and therefore a break with one of the fundamental traditions of U.S.
strategic culture--belief in safety as a norm built upon U.S. geographical isolation.
The idea of developing a defense against ballistic missiles would be
consistent with an overall effort to reestablish the integrity of the condition of
safety and geographic insularity. This is not to say that these are the only reasons
for developing a BMD system. However, other factors, such as the perceptions
of security, stability, and technological capability, did not allow this effort to
proceed in a straightforward fashion.
The first controversial issues concerned the technical feasibility and the
political and strategic desirability of such a capability. As it happens, over 40
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years later the debate still rages. With the exception of one deployment in 1975,
SAFEGUARD, which was dismantled shortly afterwards, U.S. strategic ballistic
missile defenses have not grown out of the R&D stage. The fact that such debates
have concerned a defensive system seems at first glance to be contrary to the
moral basis of America's Otrategic culture. These debates have centered not on
whether the United States should be made safe but on how. By the late 1950s
U.S. strategic thinking became dominated by the concepts of deterrence and
containment. [Ref.13:p.8] The debates have also included questions about the
viability and credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy. In contrast with the USSR, the
issues have not been contained within the circle of political-military elites. The
American democratic process actually encourages discussion of the issues among
legislative, foreign policy and technical experts and also the general public. The
result has been the generation of many different viewpoints.
2. Nuclear-Age Strategy
Gray identifies three new strategies in the post-World War II era wiich
represented innovations in American strategic culture. The first strategy was the
deterrence theory. This required a near-constant state of military readiness
during peacetime, and ran counter to America's earlier practice of being
unprepared for war, suffering initial setbacks, mobilizing and then eventually
realizing victory. [Ref.6:p.47] On the other hand, second-strike concepts of
deterrence were consistent with this strategic cultural characteristic, since
deterrence depended mainly on the ability of the United States to absorb a Soviet
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first-strike and then be able to retaliate. [Ref.4:p.68] It also recognized that
America could no longer play its traditional isolationist role in world affairs.
The second strategy was the limited war theory, which required
readiness to use limited quantities and types of force for limited political goals.
No longer was unconditional surrender seen as a viable goal for victory.
[Ref.6:p.481
Arms control theory was the third strategy. Here Gray asserts that the
normally ethical United States found merit in some level of collaboration with a
potential enemy. [Ref.6:p.481 Rather than collaboration, however, this might be
considered a manifestation of the traditional U.S. belief that eventually adversaries
will think like Americans, if they do not already do so. It also demonstrates the
American tendency to place even international conflict situations on a technical
problem-solving level, while assuming that all actors will maintain adherence to
the rule of law to the same degree.
3. Strategic Stability
In addition to the above strategies, in the mid-1960s the United States
adopted the theory of strategic stability. This was an attempt by the United States
to reduce the risk of nuclear war by means of managing and controlling the
nuclear arms competition. This theory was formulated when it was realized that
the USSR was approaching strategic parity with the United States. Fred I1i6 was
critical of this theory, which was based on the Western concept of mutual
vulnerability. [Ref.28:p.8101 According to Ikl6, from the mid-1960s to the early
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1970s the United States allowed this theory to distort its intelligence projections
for Soviet nuclear forces, justifying this on the basis that, in view of U.S. self-
restraint, the USSR would not want to overtake America or even to seek a
counterforce capability. [Ref.28:p.8131 This is a prime illustration of the dangers
of ethnocentric thinking within a nation's strategy-making mechanisms.
Strategic stability in the United States has come to mean "a condition in
which incentives inherent in the arms balance to initiate the use of strategic
nuclear forces and, closely related, to acquire new or additional forces are weak
or absent." [Ref.23:p.145] The means to create this condition fall within the
theories of nuclear conflict limitation, such as intra-war deterrence, flexible
response, and no first use. These theories use concepts of risk management and
bargaining with the opponent and are contrary to traditional definitions of
achieving victory. [Ref.23:p.1481 Gray suggests that a mutual-vulnerability theory
of strategic stability was adopted by the United States in the mid-1960s, possibly
as a result of McNamara's judgement that the East-West arms competition could
be stabilized through cooperative management based on bargaining. [Ref.6:p.136]
This is illustrative of how the U.S. national security process was affected by the
adoption of a managerial-style leadership. According to McNamara, "it made no
sense to invest in defenses in the mid-1960s because a better return on the dollar
could be had by enhancing the ability of offensive forces to penetrate enemy
defenses, thereby ensuring deterrence through assured destruction." [Ref.13:pp.23-
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24] This also demonstrates the extent to which military and international affairs
have been converted to problem-solving sets and handled as such by U.S. elites.
Further evidence of the distortion of U.S. intelligence projections is
provided by a recently declassified study' of the U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate process in the 1970's. In order to better judge U.S. intelligence estimates
regarding the Soviets, President Gerald Ford ordered the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Bush, to establish an independent intelligence review group.
In June 1976 Team B, as the group was called, began its work. The group
included experts from within and outside the government. Some insiders were
Maj.Gen. George Keegan, USAF, and Paul Wolfowitz. Outsiders included Richard
Pipes (the Team B leader), Paul Nitze, Daniel Graham, and William Van Cleave.
The report concluded that the Americans and the Soviets held different views of
strategic nuclear war and that the Soviets did not appear to accept the U.S. theory
of strategic stability. The report concluded that
the scope and vigor of Soviet programs, supported by identifiable
doctrinal imperatives, leave little reasonable doubt- that Soviet
leaders are determined to achieve the maximum attainable measure
of strategic superiority over the U.S .... which is unrestrained by
concepts of "how much is enough?"; and which is measured not in
Western assured destruction terms but rather in terms of war-
fighting objectives of achieving post-war dominance and limiting
damage to the maximum extent possible. [Ref.52:p.46]
Report by Team "B" on "Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive
Analysis" generously provided by Donald Baucom, BMDO Historian.
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"Team B's conclusions were reflected in the new National Intelligence Estimate
of Soviet Strategic Capabilities and Objectives...It became the generally accepted
national estimate of what the United States faced when Jimmy Carter became
president." [Ref.13:pp.81-82] This undoubtedly was a factor in Carter's decision
to begin building up U.S. military capabilities just before the end of his
administration.
A theory of stable deterrence and its rationale for a finite need of
weapons support the U.S. and Western belief that peacetime defense preparation
has a negative impact on society, not to mention the wasting of scarce resources.
[Ref.6:p.142] lld& argued that it was not the destructiveness of a particular
technology (i.e., nuclear weapons), but the capriciousness of both technological
developments and of America's strategic thought which led to an overemphasis
on retaliation and to the neglect of defenses in the U.S. strategic posture. He
believed it "reflect[ed] not a state of nature but a state of mind." [ReL28:p.812]
Rather than "a state of mind," others, such as McGeorge Bundy, Sidney Drell and
William J. Crowe, Jr., still regard mutual vulnerability as "a state of physics."
"There is really no present prospect that all-out defense can outrun all-out offense
in nuclear warfare ....." [Ref.21:p.1511
The result of the stalemate between these U.S. schools of thought has
been several deficiencies within the U.S. deterrence capability- 1) limited hard-
target counterforce capability; 2) non-robust C3I system; 3) minimal civil defenses
and no homeland military defenses; 4) nonexistent post-war recovery or industrial
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mobilization plans; 5) extremely limited strategic reconstitution capability; and 6)
no conceptualization of political aims in war or post-war order, owing to the
emphasis on pre-war deterrence. [Ref.6:p.145] Critics argued that the conceptual
belief in a viable U.S. deterrent force was not actually supported by the requisite
operational strategies, force structures and national security staff.
The theory of strategic stability reflected the attitudes of the political-
military elites of the 1960s and 1970s. These attitudes included the belief that
strategic superiority could not be regained. However, such superiority was not
seen as necessary for the current nuclear strategy. A continued doctrinal
commitment to superiority would have allowed the military services to request
larger forces at will, though these were deemed by the governing political elites
to have no real military or political benefit. "The primary purpose of the Assured
Destruction capabilities doctrine was to provide a metric for deciding how much
force was enough: it provided a basis for denying Service and Congressional
claims for more money for strategic forces." [Ref.49:p.1461 The evolution of
technology was considered to be at an impasse, also. An associated belief was
that, whatever the U.S. efforts, the Soviets would effectively counter them
anyway. [Ref.6:p.50]
4. Technological Issues
As stated above, the development of ballistic missile defense systems
and policy was strongly tied to the overriding nuclear strategies. Up until the
mid-1960s deployment of BMD systems was not undertaken. Reasons for this
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decision included opposition by the Administration, based on the technical
inadequacy of such systems at that time, and economic considerations.
[ReL1 3:pp.19-201
Technological breakthroughs ultimately made such a deployment
possible. However, the Administration remained concerned about the risk of
destabilizing relations with the USSR in light of the recent moves towards detente
after the 1%2 Cuban Missile crisis. The White House and Defense Department
were also concerned about the enormous costs of deploying a BMD system
capable of being effective against a massive Soviet strike. In addition,
improvements in guidance, tracking, targeting and conventional munitions offered
the possibility of deploying conventional interceptors instead of the nuclear-armed
interceptors that were increasingly politically unacceptable by the late 1970s.
[Ref.45:p.53]
5. Public Involvement
Unlike in the USSR, public debate and involvement in national issues
is encouraged in the United States. The debates surrounding BMD were no
exception. Expert opinion was fundamental in preventing the deployment of
nuclear-armed defenses, SENTINEL, equivalent to the operational Soviet system.
[Refl:p.246] Support and opposition for BMD were generated from multiple
sources, e.g., the scientific community, current and former government and
military officials, academia and university students, and concerned interest
groups. The academic-scientific community used the 1969 ABM debate to express
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negative sentiment about "U.S. defense policies from Vietnam and cost overruns
to what they perceived as a nuclear arms race." [Ref.13:p.421 Donald Baucom
identifies four international events which may have been instrumental in further
defining the BMD debate. These events were: 1) China's 1964 nuclear explosion,
2) Chinese testing of nuclear missiles, 3) China's second nuclear explosion, and
4) Soviet construction of an ABM system. [Ref.13:p.27]
Exemplary of the degree the public is involved in U.S. national security
affairs was the MX-basing issue. The MX (later known as the PEACEKEEPER)
was to replace the MINUTEMAN ICBMs. This debate not only went nation-wide
on television, but each state considered for basing was allowed to review the
Defense Department and Service studies pertaining to the im Act of the basing
on the economy, the environment and society. [Ref.13:p.175] The MX issue would
have to be resolved before any decision could be made concerning a BMD
deployment.
6. Arms Control
In order to deploy a BMD system and not irritate the Soviets, the
deployment was to be presented as protection against the slowly emerging
Chinese nuclear threat. China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. The
system would not be effective against a sophisticated Soviet attack, but would
provide a "thin defense" against the limited nuclear forces of China. [Ref.l:p.242]
This decision demonstrated the ongoing struggle for resources within the
government and the fact that active strategic defenses were not given high
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priority despite their moral appeal, in large part due to the higher priority given
to the Vietnam War then in progress. [Ref.13:p.25] Another reason for not
deploying BMD at that time was the arms-control process, which was assumed
to be actually working; it was argued that a BMD system would have derailed
past progress. [Ref.l:p.244] Some believed that a U.S. deployment of an ABM
system would provoke the Soviets into further pursuing multiple independently-
targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology to counter such efforts.
The signing of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was seen by
the international community as the capstone of U.S.-USSR detente and arms-
control policy. Expert commentary concerning the event varied. Some observers
argued that arms control, in general, constrained U.S. options while the Soviets
went ahead with their agenda. Some, such as William Van Cleave, judged that
U.S. policymakers were more concerned with limiting damage to the USSR than
their own country. [Ref.42:p.361 Gray maintained that without a damage-
limitation capability (i.e., BMD), the United States could not have a credible
deterrence policy and in reality was left with a nuclear "self-deterrence" policy.
[Ref.6:p.1191 Henry Kissinger contended "that the absence of a strong ABM
system removed a major incentive for [the Soviet deployment of] MIRVed
ICBMs." [Ref.13:p.75] The signing of the ABM Treaty was thought by many in
th. United States to have codified Soviet acceptance of strategic stability by
maintaining mutual vulnerability. Nevertheless, subsequent events called this
interpretation into question.
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The 1970s witnessed the Soviets gaining what appeared to some U.S.
experts to be a first-strike capability. Intensification of the debates over MX-
basing and BMD issues ensued. Furthermore, questions then arose as to Soviet
intentions considering the apparent disregard for complying with treaties. In
1974-1975 a breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations began, particularly exacerbated by
Soviet MIRVing of new ICBMs, Soviet renouncement of a trade agreement with
the United States, Soviet support of North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam,
and evidence of Soviet violations of SALT I. In the late 1970s the Soviets openly
increased strategic offensive forces and in 1979 invaded Afghanistan.
[Ref.13:pp.75-75] Congressional attitudes toward BMD by this time began to shift,
allowing increased efforts in deployment and prototype work [Ref.45:p.291
Congress at first attempted to keep the United States within the strictest
interpretation of the ABM Treaty and severely restricted funding for normal
offensive force modernization and BMD R&D. These attitudes demonstrated the
effect that international events, e.g., the Vietnam War and its political aftermath,
were having on the government. It was also a time when Congress was
attempting to reassert its influence in international affairs and military issues,
areas that had been previously considered the executive branch's domain.
[ReLl:p.203] But by the end of the 1970s it was obvious that the USSR had not
restrained its own strategic force activity and Congress finally permitted the
United States to proceed. [Ref.28:p.814]
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Only one ABM site, SAFEGUARD, was actually deployed for missile
defense by 1975 in accordance with the 1974 amendment to the ABM Treaty.
Nonetheless, by 1976 its dismantlement had begun. Congressional reasoning for
killing SAFEGUARD was based on Soviet MIRVing of ICBMs which apparently
nullified any ABM capability. [Ref.13:p.97] Those against BMD had feared a
defensive arms race with the USSR, assuming erroneously that the Soviets always
followed a U.S. lead. [Ref.28:p.815] Some critics saw the deployment of BMD
around missiles as iniquitous, since civilian populations were left unprotected.
In general, most Americans favored arms control talks but did not want the
United States to be placed at a disadvantage. American attitudes toward BMD
began to be more sharply defined as a result of certain international events in
1979-1982, including the fal! of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian hostage crisis; the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the East-West confrontations over the
positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ground-launched
cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. [Ref.13:p.182] The result was to be a renewed
emphasis on BMD.
When President Reagan took office, the nation still had no consensus on
the MX-basing issue. U.S. strategic defenses were limited to: 1) early warning, 2)
surveillance, 3) token control of U.S. airspace, and 4) a reserve force able only to
hold off small-scale bomber and cruise missile attacks. [Ref.4:pp.68-69] Reagan
was personally distressed with the lack of U.S. defensive capability and embarked
on an intense campaign to rectify this situation. The basic political statement to
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the Soviets was that the United States desired to stay within ABM Treaty
limitations but had to respond to the growth in Soviet strategic capabilities,
possibly by using high-technology-an area of Soviet weakness. [Ref.13:p.179]
7. Strategic Defense Initiative
In 1983 U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the new Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) and in 1991 U.S. President George Bush announced the
scaled-down version known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
(GPALS). Both programs were (and are) subjects of heated debates. Until the
SDI, the United States had had no robust BMD R&D programs since the
SAFEGUARD site was dismantled in 1976.
The establishment of SDI reflected many of America's strategic cultural
characteristics. It was to fill the immoral void left by the lack of strategic
defenses. Second, it fit well into Reagan's plan of breaking the Soviet Union via
economic means, a traditional American strength. The GPALS version of SDI
envisaged a more realistic system for near-term deployment, while not stressing
America's economic resources as much.
Despite the great extent and public nature of the nuclear and strategic
defense debate, "in 1985 only about one-third of the public had heard about the
ABM/SALT I treaty...Approximately 75 percent of the public...[held] the
(inaccurate) belief that the United States... [had] a fairly effective defense against
nuclear weapons. Most people... [were] satisfied with our (non-existent) defense
against nuclear attack" [Ref.5:pp.1-3] These attitudes are consistent with
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America's traditional strategic cultural characteristic, the condition of relative
safety as a norm, resulting from the isolated U.S. geostrategic position.
8. Conclusion
The events of the 1990s to date have shaken the traditional tenets of
national security planners. The Gulf War changed the focus of U.S. BMD efforts
from a strategic level to a theater level of development. The dissolution of the
USSR in 1991 has had several consequences. First, it fundamentally altered (or
even, some would argue, eliminated) the central threat to the United States while
at the same time multiplying (at least temporarily) the number of nuclear
weapons states. Second, the validity of past treaties, e.g., the ABM Treaty, and
of recent arms control agreements with Moscow, e.g., the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START) accords, has been questioned by some in both Russia
and the United States, in addition to the newly independent republics of Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Third, the United States has unilaterally declared cuts
in its strategic nuclear forces beyond those required by START I. Fourth, in 1992
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President George Bush discussed the
possibility of joint U.S.-Russian BMD development. [Ref.41] And finally, the
United States elected in November 1992 a new president who has yet to formulate
a detailed national security strategy.
The United States is technologically superior to the former Soviet Union
(FSU). If the United States wanted to do so, it could deploy some sort of space-
based BMD well before Moscow could. However, the obstacles to such a
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deployment for the United States are political rather than technological. Each
new administration may lose more of the determination initiated by Reagan in
1983. The Moscow of the 1980s, though lacking technological capability
equivalent to that of the United States, once politically committed, could have
sustained its efforts and deployed a system, whether or not 100 percent effective,
before the United States did so. [Ref.10.p.87]
This was not, of course, the same Moscow that the United States will be
facing for the rest of this century and early into the next. Though noted in the
context of "technical skepticism" about Soviet BMD capability, it has become part
of U.S. "strategic-cultural" thinking to assume that America has the ability to catch
up technologically and/or quantitatively with any other country's capabilities by
using American technical and economic assets, given political will. [Ref.16:p.66]
This assumption that the United States can always catch up tends to make it
difficult to formulate, implement and adhere to long-term strategies. Another
enduring feature of American strategic culture is the high regard for the law. The
future of U.S. BMD efforts will be heavily dependent on the status of the ABM
Treaty and other arms control treaties.
B. RUSSIAN BMD POLICY-DEVELOPMENT
Russian BMD policy may have been influenced by one or more of the
strategic cultural determinants identified in the previous chapter. This se.A!on
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explores the development of Soviet, then Russian, BMD policy within the context
of Russian strategic culture.
1. Background
As in the United States, the development of BMD in the USSR began
shortly after the development of ballistic missiles. The Soviet BMD system was
just one part of an extensive air defense system, which included surface-to-air
missiles and aircraft interceptors, designed to protect the Soviet homeland.
The Soviets developed their first BMD components in the mid-1950s and
by the early 1960s began constructing a BMD ring near Leningrad (renamed Sankt
Petersburg in 1991). A while later a system was built around Moscow. During
the 1960s the Soviets did not publicly acknowledge the possibility of a strategic
defense arms race. Prime Minister Kosygin said the ABM system was defensive
for the purpose of protecting people. At that time Kosygin and others presumed
that an arms race could only occur with offensive systems. [Ref.10.p.251
The question is why Soviet BMD policy formed as it did, leaving Russia
with only one operational BMD site around Moscow. It is hoped that the study
of Russian strategic culture will help to clarify this.
Whereas in the United States, BMD policy has been closely tied to the
prevailing nuclear strategy and subject to scrutiny by the informed public, this
was not the case in the USSR. Public opinion in the USSR was not a factor in
policy formulation as a result of the highly centralized decision-making process
which only involved the upper political and military echelons. [Ref.23:p.143]
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Once made, decisions were executed from the top-down and resources were
allocated with few objections. There was also no real public reaction or protest
to the deployment of nuclear-tipped interceptors in the Moscow ABM site.
2. Strategic Defense Requirements
David Yost identifies three requirements of Soviet military doctrine
which demanded strategic defense capabilities. First was the ability to dissuade
Europe and the United States from using nuclear weapons. If this was not
possible, then the attempt was to be made to limit the use of nuclear weapons
and prevent the extension of the geographical scope and intensity of nuclear
operations. [Ref.17:p.110] As for being tied to the nuclear strategy, by the mid-
to late-1950s the Soviet General Staff had incorporated nuclear weapons into its
war-fighting art, denying that nuclear weapons "effected a historical discontinuity
in the utility...of the resort to force." [Ref.6:p.68] Unlike the United States, which
has had three different strategies, i.e., nuclear deterrence, air-land battle, and
maritime strategy, the Soviets developed both offensive and defensive forces,
including nuclear, to work in a single combined-arms approach. [Ref.34:p.123]
Nuclear weapons were fully integrated into the Soviet concept of operations and
political-military strategies. [Ref.17:p.731
The second and third requirements reflected Moscow's preference for
conventional means of war. Strategic defenses would help limit nuclear effects
against Warsaw Pact forces plus protect against any retaliatory strikes in response
to the Soviet use of nuclear weapons. [Ref.17:pp.112-1141 The above requirements
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for the Soviet military doctrine reflected not only a long-term military strategy,
but also the need for long-term and intensive political and diplomatic efforts as
well. The centralized policy-making process and single ideology enabled the
Soviets to strive for long-term goals.
3. Nuclear Strategy
Gray notes the impact of some elements of strategic culture on Soviet
nuclear strategy. First, the Soviet ideology identified the enemy, i.e., all non-
socialist countries. Second, Soviet strategy disallowed any substitute for victory
in war. Third, it was the politician's duty to deter war, while the military's duty
was to prepare for thte conduct of war. [Ref.6:p.881
Fourth is the very important factor that war should be survivable and,
therefore, required damage-limitation capabilities, e.g., BMD. The issue of
survivability is discussed in more detail below. Fifth, the USSR did not expect
a nuclear war to be cheap and appeared ready to pay the cost. [Ref.6:p.88]
Finally, there was only one source of military science, the General Staff,
which viewed war as fighting, not bargaining. [Ref.6:p.881 These considerations
illustrate key differences in Soviet and U.S. thinking.
4. National Security Strategy
Soviet strategic doctrine dictated that Soviet strategic forces strive in all
available ways to enhance the prospect that the USSR could survive a war, while
concurrent efforts were to be made to defeat the main enemy, should deterrence
fail, in some politically and militarily meaningful way. With a less advanced
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econc,,ny, the USSR could not rely as heavily on technological solutions to
security problems as could the United States. The pursuit of these goals was
intended to help deter or prevent nuclear war while simultaneously attaining
other strategic and foreign policy objectives. [Ref.23:p.139J This doctrine enabled
both political and military institutions to work towards a common goal. The
Communist Party of the Soviet Union appeared to be more concerned with the
survival of essential state assets than with the survival of the people. [Ref.6:p.xiiJ
However, evidence exists that the previous Communist-driven unity in effort has
begun to fracture profoundly with the increasing competition for scarce resources
and political control within Russia.
Because of its requirement for survivability, the USSR was never able to
accept the Western concepts of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability.
Nonetheless, many saw the signing of the 1972 ABM I.eaty as an indication of
Soviet acceptance of these concepts. [Ref.10:p.84] Others viewed the treaty as a
means for the Soviets to catch up with the United States, while limiting U.S.
progress. [Ref.23:p.146] The Soviets may have agreed to limitations in the Treaty
because of U.S. technological superiority at that time in BMD. However, Moscow
needed to retain some capability to develop BMD not only against the United
States but also China. The United States had its own theory of mutual
vulnerability as a basis for strategic stability, and some argue that this theory was
used against the United States to the USSR's advantage. [Ref.17:p.100] Despite
the ABM Treaty and U.S. claims for strategic stability through mutual
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vulnerability, Soviet political and military leaders made every effort to reduce
their vulnerability. [Ref.28:p.814]
5. Technological Issues
Moscow, like Washington, has had its BMD programs and policies
affected by political, economic and technological limitations. In the late 1960s
Soviet attitudes towards BMD and superpower relations began to change. The
Soviets were near nuclear parity and chose to use the Western notion of strategic
stability through mutual vulnerability to gain U.S. approval of the BMD
limitations codified in the ABM Treaty. [Ref.10:p.26] This change in the Soviet
view towards BMD and the arms race also reflected the USSR's growing
economic and technological constraints.
In the early 1960s the USSR was still optimistic about the technological
feasibility of a BMD system, especially considering the success of the Sputnik
mission. [Ref.10:p.26] However, by the end of the decade critics claimed that
BMD systems were not as technically feasible and effective as initially thought.
Claims of 100 percent effectiveness stopped and only four of the original eight
BMD complexes around Moscow were completed. [Ref.10:p.30] Growing Soviet
doubts about the desirability of deploying a defensive system that would not be
100 percent effective began In correlate more with U.S. rationales for non-
deployment based on budgetary and technological concerns.
Soviet systems were nonetheless deployed even if flawed and followed
the practice of incremental modernization typical of the Soviet regime. Prompt
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operational applications took priority over optimal effectiveness. [Ref. 17:p.26] The
Soviet BMD system signified a steady, measured commitment to deploy available
technology in compliance with the ABM Treaty. [ReL.16:p.531
6. Arms Control
After a decade of rapid Soviet military expansion, around 1974 spending
had to be reprioritized according to Leonid Brezhnev's assessment that the USSR
was more secure and the economic situation was worsening. Brezhnev resisted
attempts by the defense ministry to increase military spending, much to its
chagrin. In order to relieve the internal pressures, Brezhnev called on the
international community to slow the arms race. [Ref1O:pp.46-481 Not by chance
was an amendment made to the ABM Treaty in 1974 which reduced the number
of allowable ABM sites to one.
The SALT agreements of the 1970s were based on the theories about
strategic implications of existing armaments whose military capabilities were
reasonably understood, whereas, future capabilities of weapons, such as space-
based BMD systems, are subject to speculation. Bruce Parrott believes that the
Washington confused the Soviets by contradicting strategic concepts the United
States had advocated in the mid-i 970s (i.e., strategic stability through mutual
vulnerability). [Ref.10:p.84] The contradiction Parrott refers to was the
announcement in 1983 of SDI plus the U.S. military build-up. The Soviets had
concluded the arms-control agreements of the 1970s as a way to codify Soviet
gains, to reduce the likelihood of a U.S. military build-up and to permit the
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slowing of the Soviet military's growth in light of economic constraints.
[Ref.10:p.10]
The USSR grew increasingly concerned when the U.S. SDI program was
announced and Moscow feared a U.S. "breakout" from the ABM Treaty. The
Soviets since 1972 the 1960s had tied adherence to offensive arms-control
agreements with compliance with the ABM Treaty. Since 1972 the Soviets had
considered commitment to the ABM Treaty more important than a full-scale BMD
deployment in order to limit U.S. progress. [Ref.16:p.22] For example, the 1986
Reykjavik summit saw the relinkage of the continuation of negotiations for the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which was signed in December
1987) with limitations on SDI. [Ref.10:.p.67] Remaining within the ABM Treaty
limitations allowed scarce Soviet resources to be used elsewhere while
concurrently restraining U.S. BMD opportunities. The Soviets were able to use
the American propensity to abide by laws, both national and international, to
their advantage. Moscow has used the Defense and Space Talks to gain U.S.
assurances about compliance with the ABM Treaty. [Ref.16:p.53]
7. Conclusion
Moscow's strategic planners have been obsessed with the initial period
of war because it is seen as decisive for the final outcome. The General Staff
wanted to dominate this period by achieving a radical shift in the correlation of
forces in their favor. [Ref.10:p.162] At present, with no BMD system in the United
States, limited strategic targeting could have prevented the United States from
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projecting its forces to Europe on the NATO schedule. This would have a
tremendous impact on the initial period of the war. However, a BMD
deployment, which could protect NATO, would reflect a very different Western
psychological attitude towards modern warfare. The concept of mutual
vulnerability, assuming near 100 percent BMD effectiveness, could no longer be
expected to constrain Western force development. Obviously, the impact on
Moscow's political and military leadership and strategy would be dramatic.
[Ref.10:pp.172-173]
Soviet ideology and Russian history would appear to have dictated the
need for a more robust strategic BMD system than was actually deployed,
assuming that the survival of the core political-military leadership was of
paramount importance. Russia will undoubtedly retain this belief well into the
next century. Even if Russia were to fragment further, the new political entities
would probably also operate under this premise of survival priorities, at least in
the near term.
Keeping the above in mind and recognizing Moscow's comprehensive
approach to strategy, the importance given to strategic defense as a whole can be
appreciated. However, in view of continuing economic and technological
constraints, Moscow has had to rely on other strategic defense elements, instead
of BMD, in order to achieve its goals. The low level of BMD deployments should
not be seen as an indication of a lack of interest in strategic defense.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN BMD POLICY
So far the strategic culture (Chapter 11) and BMD policy development
(Chapter III) of the United States and Russia have been examined from similar
analytical perspectives. Where has this research led? What have been identified
as the overriding differences in the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures? What are
their priorities and preoccupations? This chapter intends to answer these
questions to furnish a basis for exploring the possible future of U.S. and Russian
BMD policies and the ABM Treaty.
A. THE U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURAL IMPACT ON BMD POLICY
The impact of strategic culture on U.S. and Russian BMD policy is
examined and compared within broad categories. This should provide a dearer
understanding of the unique qualities of each country's strategic culture as it
affects its BMD policies, including different concepts of employing BMD.
1. Geostrategic Situation, Threat Perceptions, Technological Culture
One of the biggest differences between U.S. and Russian strategic
culture is based on each country's geostrategic situation. The American
perception of distant security dangers has allowed the United States to forego the
deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system until such time as such
defenses are deemed necessary, i.e., a new immediate threat. Whereupon the
United States will also rely on its high-technology base to produce a NMD
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system. Aside from the hardening of missile silos and command sites, and early
warning assets (such as NORAD), and limited air defense capabilities, the pursuit
of other strategic ballistic missile defense measures is unlikely. In response to
new regional threats and the failings of proliferation controls, the United States
is pursuing the development of new high-technology theater missile defense
(TMD) systems for use in regional contingencies.
In the USSR, as in Russia, a threat to state survival was perceived to
exist on all sides. With the experiences of World War II, the USSR saw a clear
need for all types of strategic defense, both passive and active. However,
technology did not permit the construction of effective national BMD. Russian
and Soviet strategic culture did not include as great a reliance on technological
solutions to national security problems as has been the case in the United States.
Instead, using its geostrategic position, Russia pursued other strategic defense
options to include deep underground hardened command facilities, industrial
dispersal plans and mobile launchers. Russia is faced with a rapidly degenerating
economic and industrial situation and will most likely continue to invest in "low-
tech" passive strategic defense measures, despite a perception of more immediate
threats along its border as a result of the retention of nuclear missiles by some of
the former republics and the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to
some neighboring Third World states. [Ref.561 The desire for high-technology
defensive systems, such as Russia saw the United States employ during the Gulf
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War, to counter these threats is high, though actual acquisition in the near term
would require the assistance of one or more of the advanced industrial countries.
2. Rule of Law, Moral Standards/Ideology, Role of the Informed Public
All of these factors-traditional attitudes about the rule of law and the
moral order, upheld by an informed public-to some degree have militated against
the United States violating or unilaterally abrogating the ABM Treaty in pursuit
of a NMD system. In this regard, the rule of law and the role of the informed
public have had the most impact. However, high moral standards have been one
of the many factors in defining BMD requirements. Many Americans have
argued that, if a BMD system were to be deployed, the effectiveness of such a
system must be extremely high for the protection of the population.
The establishment of an ABM Treaty Compliance Review Group and the
powers held by the U.S. Congress as regards treaties are among the many
indications of the important part the above factors play within U.S. national
strategy. Additionally, these factors can often be more self-constraining to the
United States than to Russia because of American principles of legality. No
allegations of U.S. infringements of the ABM Treaty compare with the actual
violations publicly acknowledged by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (e.g.,
the Krasnoyarsk radar). These factors suggest that the United States will continue
only the R&D stage of its strategic BMD efforts unless: the ABM Treaty can be
legally amended to permit more extensive deployments and/or an immediate
threat to national security arises requiring a BMD response.
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Given the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the U.S.
general public now feels free to return to its traditional insular view of the world
and neglects the realities of the extent of instability within the international
system. The overall U.S. reaction to the fall of the USSR could be compared to
the reaction of the public to a successful anti-trust lawsuit against a major
corporation; the newly independent "spinoff" entities are assumed to proceed in
accordance with the law. It is unrealistic to treat international events of this
magnitude in such a manner.
The above factors, with the exception of ideology, did not have the same
degree of influence on Soviet national strategy and BMD policy. In attempting
to meet ideological goals, including state survival, laws were fluid and malleable.
This element has been consistently present since Russia's imperial age when the
tsar could enact and overturn laws nearly at will to suit the purposes of the state.
In this situation, many public laws and moral considerations were subordinated
to the needs of the state and, therefore, were not an integral part of strategy-
making. Modem Russia must overcome this traditional disregard for the law if
it is to successfully achieve progress towards creating a democracy. The
subordination of the public to the state probably reached its peak during the
Soviet period. Nevertheless, with the changes in Russia the role of the public in
defining Russia's national strategy (and BMD policy) may become more important
with time. Of course, this means that Russia's national strategy will probably
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become more subject to popular political fluctuations, much like American
strategy is.
3. Military SupportM Military Status, Governmental Structure
The United States historically has not willingly supported a large,
standing military force. Nevertheless, the post-World War H international
security environment compelled the United States to maintain a large force. Now
with the Cold War "won," the United States is again reducing its military. The
impact on BMD policy has been dramatic. From a time of virtually no BMD
capabilities to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative with an emphasis on NMD
systems, the Clinton Administration has altered the course of U.S. BMD efforts
again by shifting priorities from NMD to theater missile defense. The Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has even recently been renamed the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). [Ref.531 Also indicative of BMD's
status change was the fact that the announcement about the BMDO was made by
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, whereas in the previous two
administrations (Reagan and Bush) major changes in the SDIO's status were
announced personally by the President. The continued changing of priorities
portends further uncertainty for BMD's future as national strategy retains its
short-term vision.
Though the military services, particularly the U.S. Army and Air Force,
have conducted and sponsored extensive BMD R&D, they have not been the main
drivers behind BMD policy. Rather, members of the Executive and Legislative
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branches of government, arms control advocates, and the scientific community--
and the budget--have influenced the support (or lack thereof) for BMD policy.
U.S. military strategy is focused on deterrence and, if necessary, war-fighting
overseas. The U.S. language of war is centered on escalation control and
minimizing U.S. and allied casualties. As scenarios of probable future conflicts
have changed, the military has become more supportive of TMD in support of
these roles.
In contrast to the United States, Russia (and the USSR) historically has
required a large military force to protect the vast expanse of its territory. To the
extent possible, almost the entire Soviet population received some sort of military
and civil defense training in order to be better prepared to support the armed
forces in the next major war effort. Nuclear weapons were integrated into Soviet
military doctrine as a means of achieving security goals. Even with the
dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, Russia's national security
interests still require large forces. However, the ability to support such a military
has been severely degraded by the disintegration of the socialist economy. The
Russian government is also no longer able to make demands on the people to the
same degree as before. In fact, demands are being placed upon the Russian
government by the regions as never before and in many cases the regions are
disregarding Moscow's decrees and directives. [ReL551 In addition, the myth of
an invincible army has been shattered. The military is now the subject of a very
negative public backlash, partly as a result of the hardships suffered by the
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people for the military over the past several decades. Nevertheless, the stability
of the government depends upon the relationship with the military as long as the
government needs the military's support as the ultimate guarantor of public
order. The impact of all this on BMD is that BMD currently does not have a very
high priority within the military.
The Soviet military's primary goals were the protection of the Party and
military leadership and the main elements of the Soviet control structure. BMD
policy has been oriented toward an effective active system centered on preserving
the government, as with the GALOSH sites deployed around Moscow, to be
capable of carrying on even after a nuclear exchange. Despite military and
economic hardships GALOSH remains operational. National strategy is still the
purview of the political-military elites, who will probably try to retain its long-
term strategic vision as well as events will allow. Russia's language of war
remains similar to the old Soviet war-fighting doctrine, while now also
emphasizing the need for internal stability and protecting the interests of Russian
minorities in former Soviet republics on Russia's periphery. Apparently the
military continues to view nuclear weapons as an integral part of its military
doctrine. [Ref.54] However, as Russia seeks outside assistance it may try to
distance itself further from the old Soviet image and relegate the use of nuclear
weapons to extreme and improbable circumstances, in an approach similar to that
of the United States. On the other hand, economic weaknesses and shortcomings
in conventional military capabilities may lead the Russians to emphasize nuclear
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weapons more than during the last phase of the Soviet period. Once Russia
establishes a modernized R&D and production capability able to support its
military needs, the military may more vigorously pursue BMD, but in the area of
mobile ATBMs, and continue efforts in other areas of passive and active strategic
defense.
4. Security Perceptions, Reliance on Economy and Technology
The end of the Cold War has meant a perception of enhanced security
for the United States. The threat has shifted from a major central adversary to
lesser regional contingencies. The traditional American psychological condition
of relative safety has thus been reinforced, whether or not it reflects objective
reality. This factor further tempers the development and deployment of strategic
BMD systems, though research will continue. In addition, it increases the reliance
on U.S. economic and technological capability to develop such systems quickly
in a time of crisis. This also assumes that the United States will maintain its
economic and technological superiority. Though no strategic BMD systems will
be deployed in the near-term, the new threat focus has resulted in a demand for
more effective theater-level missile defenses. Passive strategic defenses will
probably continue mainly in the realm of technical solutions, e.g., hardening and
stealth, rather than civil defense programs.
Russia is faced with a fear that even the Soviet Union wasn't wholly
concerned with; that is, the fear of the further loss of territory or the
disintegration of Russia proper. Russia's strategic focus has also shifted from a
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global perspective to a more regional view. Nevertheless, this "region" is adjacent
to its borders, whereas the American regional concerns are far overseas. With a
national security threat not only externally more immediate (and nuclear-armed)
but also internal, Russia's traditional xenophobia (at least in some important
political movements) has been reinforced. A recent Russian report also indicates
a heightened threat resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. [Ref.56] Given the opportunity and ability, and still faced with a
missile threat, Russia would strive for a more comprehensive BMD system.
Russia is currently unable, either politically, economically or
technologically, to field large-scale BMD systems, though it will try to continue
its R&D work. If any system were to be developed and deployed at this time, it
would most likely be a mobile TMD system. However, this is very costly as well.
Russia will have to rely on "low-tech" or Soviet-era "off the shelf' solutions to its
security problems for the near-term or seek Western assistance. This may in part
explain Russia's recent inquiry to the United States as to the status of the Global
Protection System (GPS). The 1991 U.S. proposal for a GPS grew out of both
Reagan's proposal to share U.S. BMD technology with the Soviets and Bush's
proposed GPALS. The purpose of GPS would be to shift the basis of the U.S.-
Russian relationship from strategic offensive weapons to strategic defense.
5. International Status
Within this century the United States has risen from isolationism to
status as a superpower with global interests and responsibilities. The dissolution
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of the USSR has left the United States as the only superpower, though not the
only nuclear power. The United States has found that its many global
commitments prevent it from returning to an isolationist mode. The United States
also seems to be operating under the assumption that foreign powers share the
strategic interests of the United States, even in cases where they clearly do not.
These factors tend to encourage the United States to pursue not only a NMD but
also a gi -'lal BMD system, similar to some versions of Reagan's SDI proposal.
This would also be assuming that foreign powers would be better off and willing
to have a system under the control of the American "honest broker." This seems
to have been one of th.- assumptions behind the U.S.-proposed Global Protection
System. GPS was to include Russia and some of the newly independent
republics, in addition to U.S. allies.
GPS would have allowed an opportunity of a different sort for the U.S.
role in international politics. It included the notion that the development and
deployment of BMD "not only protects vital U.S. interests...but it provides a
foundation for positive and enduring improvement in the U.S.-Soviet
relationship." [Ref.26:p.10] Though Stephen Hadley, then Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy, stated this in 1990, the general
philosophy was endorsed until early 1993. This philosophy sought to change the
basis of the U.S.-Russian military relationship from offensive strategic weapons
to defensive systems. The change from SDI and its "Star Wars" connotations to
GPS with its sense of protection signalled a new direction in U.S. strategic
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thinking. How far the Clinton Administration will continue this effort is
uncertain, especially with the downgrading of BMIYs status.
However, with growing regional threats, military drawdowns and
economic constraints, the pursuit of a costly system such as GPS is very unlikely.
This conclusion is supported by the Clinton Administration's reprioritization of
BMD to emphasize TMD first, with strategic BMD a far lower priority. Any
further discussions concerning a GPS-type system might therefore be for political
purposes, e.g., confidence-building measures, rather than for actual deployment
in the foreseeable future. The United States seems to be uncertain about the exact
role it should play in the new international environment.
Russia, obviously, is undergoing quite a different experience. Not even
Imperial Russia went through such drastic dismantlement, especially without a
major conflict, as the Soviet Union experienced in 1991. Though still a major
nuclear power, Russia's international standing has been badly shaken, and it has
had to curtail many of its global commitments. Unable to militarily reassert itself
as a superpower, Russia is relying on diplomatic measures to retain the
appearance of power on the international scene. Though Russian President Boris
Yeltsin expressed interest in the U.S.-proposed GPS as recently as the 4 April 1993
Vancouver Summit, the domestic political situation prevents Russia from
participation if Moscow sees itself as negotiating from a position of weakness.
[Ref.55]
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In 1992 Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev brought up
four points concerning a joint BMD system. First, cooperation would only be
considered in areas of missile attack early warning. Second, Yeltsin's 1992
statement about a joint GPS was politically motivated, and intended to
demonstrate the new attitude towards the United States. Third, the costs of active
defenses were prohibitive. Finally, the ABM Treaty must remain as it stands.
[Ref.20:p.161 Grachev subsequently stated that Russian compliance with the
START I and II agreements was closely tied to U.S. compliance with the ABM
Treaty. [Ref.61] Yeltsin has reiterated Russian support for the continuation of the
ABM Treaty. Russia evidently fears that the dissolution of the treaty would allow
the United States to make rapid technological progress and to deploy ground- and
space-based BMD systems unopposed, while Russia is unable to compete.
This sentiment also affects any possibility of renegotiating the ABM
Treaty. If Russia were to appear as bargaining from a position of weakness or
being "bought out" by the West, the old Russian conservative social order might
mount a destabilizing or paralyzing domestic political campaign against such
efforts. Support for ending the ABM Treaty nonetheless does exist in some circles
in Russia, as indicated by statements of Alexander Savelyev of the Institute for
National Security and Strategic Studies in Moscow. Savelyev states that "the
ABM Treaty must be abandoned as soon as possible because it creates real
obstacles for further improvement of Russian-American relations...." [Ref.57:p.1071
74
B. FUTURE OF US.-RUSSIAN BMD POLICY
The dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 has had multiple
implications for both U.S. and Russian BMD developments and strategic cultures.
The delegitimization of the Soviet ideology has resulted in not only the
reclassification of national security threats in new ideological terms, but also the
concession that a command-economy focused mostly on supporting the military
was ineffective in maintaining the country's integrity. Russia suddenly found
itself without its security buffer zone against European and Asian threats, and
some of the new neighbors now hold nuclear weapons under ambiguous control.
[Ref.24:p.10]
1. Future of BMD
The U.S. proposal of GPALS in 1991 recognized the diminished U.S.
perception of the Soviet strategic threat and the increasing concern about an
accidental or unauthorized launch from the USSR, as well as the long-term threat
that might be posed by Third World ballistic missiles. The United States hailed
the dissolution of the USSR as the great victory of democracy over communism.
The expectations for Russia, at !east those publicly voiced, seemed to assume that
"democratic and capitalist phoenix" could arise from the ashes of communism.
Obviously the difficulty of introducing and implementing unfamiliar theories in
a country which stretches across eleven time zones was not readily apparent to
some. Again the United States displayed its weak grasp of the magnitude of the
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challenges; such profound changes cannot occur overnight or possibly even in this
generation.
Many in the United States have overreacted optimistically to Russian
statements. In view of this, Henry Kissinger criticized the premise of the Charter
for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship as exemplifying the U.S.
tendency towards ethnocentric thinking. The widespread Ame~ican assumption
is that with the end of communism the spread of democracy will guarantee
permanent peace. Russia now is assumed to share identical goals, thereby
allowing the "strategic partnership" to promote and defend common democratic
values throughout the world. [Ref.30] Many informed and experienced observers
have expressed deep concerns and skepticism about such an idea. [Ref.55]
Both countries have refocused their efforts towards the domestic
economy and away from defense. Funding for U.S. strategic defense programs
has been cut, owing to the perceived absence of a strategic threat, and BMD
programs have been reprioritized to address emerging regional threats. Elements
of the USSR's BMD system are now dispersed throughout several new
independent states, and Russia's military needs are being subjugated even further
to economic and domestic considerations.
Considering economic constraints alone, the likelihood of either the
United States or Russia deploying a substantial strategic BMD system in the
foreseeable future is minimal. The recognition of the dangers from the global
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proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology, plus Russia's new
security situation, have refocused BMD efforts towards mobile ATBM systems.
A previously inconceivable effort was initiated in late 1991 to explore
the options for U.S.-Russian cooperative development of BMD. Reagan had
broached the idea of sharing BMD technology but not actual defense systems.
Boris Yeltsin in January 1992 initially signalled a readiness to jointly design and
create a jointly operated BMD system, the Global Protection System (GPS), in
place of the U.S. SDI program. [Ref.41] This offer was later withdrawn, probably
under strong pressure from the military establishment. However, as noted above,
Yeltsin did inquire about GPS at the 1993 Vancouver Summit. Some analysts
believe that the Russians may be taking a more positive view of BMD than in the
past and may be amenable to allowing limited BMD deployments by the United
States beyond what permitted by the ABM Treaty. [Ref.55]
2. Future of the ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty remains central to any future strategic BMD pursuits.
Whether the treaty is ignored, abrogated, amended or made multilateral, its status
will be largely determined by the U.S.-Russian relationship and by national
choices. Russia's security perceptions and political stability will be key variables.
The United States has recently signalled its willingness to stay within the
bounds of the ABM Treaty, by lowering SDIO's bureaucratic status (indeed, by
renaming the organization) and by emphasizing TMD development. These U.S.
decisions may have been influenced by a desire to avoid putting further internal
77
domestic pressure on Yeltsin's government, but they are also consistent with
several U.S. strategic cultural characteristics noted in the previous section.
Russia has strongly linked the ABM Treaty with its international image.
Moscow's insistence that the ABM Treaty is still legitimate is in part intended to
ensure that the United States does not unilaterally proceed with BMD
development and deployment beyond treaty limits. If Moscow did not think this
was sufficient, it could press for making the treaty multilateral. The likelihood
that major changes to the Treaty could be agreed upon in this situation is
extremely low. However, Moscow may find this option more self-constraining,
especially if its traditional view of the rule of law changes, i.e., toward a
perspective more compatible with that of the United States.
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V. CONCLUSION
How will Russian strategic culture be modified as a result of the Soviet
experience? Will divergent U.S. and Russian strategic cultures lead to continued
independent BMD pursuits, or will the potential exist for cooperation in BMD
development and deployment? What will be the future of the ABM Treaty?
Owing to the difficulty in developing a hard definition of a country's
strategic culture to be used in analyzing national strategy, some may be inclined
to dismiss strategic culture outright as an impractical analytical method. It could
be claimed that economic, technological and even bureaucratic methods provide
more focused and more reliable "hard" analysis. Nevertheless, the conclusions
this thesis has presented indicate that strategic culture is a sound method when
its limits are recognized. As stated before, no one theory can offer a complete
explanation or consistently reliable forecasts of a nation's strategy and actions.
Examination of complex issues, such as national strategy, requires the use of
multiple, diverse perspectives if a deeper understanding is to be achieved.
Long-standing ideological principles, such as democracy and
constitutionality, heavily affect U.S. strategic culture, as does the more recent
emphasis on quantitative strategic analysis. The American experiences of war
(and relatively limited encounters with defeat) have resulted in the cultural
characteristics of a relatively low threshold for withstanding pain and the belief
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that victory must entail no more than modest levels of U.S. casualties. Moreover,
the perception of security threats as distant and the reliance on technical "fixes"
to international problems have allowed U.S. national strategy to focus on the
near-term and to rely on crisis response measures, especially with a lower risk of
global war. The pluralistic American government, although it impedes the
development and implementation of long-term strategy, does allow multiple
perspectives to coexist and often to overcome shortcomings in national policy.
Despite the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international
environment, U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed at
this point in time.
U.S. decisionmakers must realize that Russia's first concern is for Russia,
not the maintenance of international order. Rooted in the American strategic
culture is an abhorrence of instability, and it remains inconceivable to many
Americans that, now with the disappearance of the "evil empire", instability is still
present. With this mind-set, any conflicts which occur may be considered
problematic "fires" which can be easily put out. It is not possible for major
systemic problems to exist, it is widely assumed, since it has been proven that
"good" (i.e., democracy) will prevail. Therefore, only limited "fire-fighting
equipment" (i.e., ATBM) is needed. Here again the United States depends on
technical solutions to solve potentially serious political and strategic problems.
In contrast, the collapse of the USSR has had major consequences for
Russia's strategic culture. First, Russia's threat percejstion has been refocused to
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regional dangers closer to its borders. Second, the "myth" of the great Red Army
has been broken and the population's support for the military has been vastly
reduced. The military and political dominance over strategy-making nonetheless
remains essentially unchanged. Also the military appears to be operating under
basically the same doctrine as during the Soviet period. Third, with the political
turmoil in Moscow political power is becoming more diffused to regional
authorities. In addition, many in Moscow are struggling against various extremist
political movements to replace the guiding ideology of Marxism-Leninism with
"something else," that is, a more democratic and market-oriented system of
government. However, to achieve these goals Russia must also enhance the role
of the rule of law and constitutional order. Russia's international prestige and
superpower status had been traditionally sought via military means. Nonetheless,
with Russia's current situation, Moscow is obliged to rely on political and
diplomatic means in order to maintain an approximation of its former status.
Considering the competition within the Russian government between
conservative and quasi-liberal factions; the USSR's dissolution; military
disapproval of the situation; and the relatively few major institutional reforms,
Russian discussion of mutual BMD development is a good strategic move on
Moscow's part. It throws Washington into internal disarray as the U.S. agencies
argue over the advantages, disadvantages and modalities of aid to the former
adversary. Russia can prevent any U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty and
unilateral BMD activity beyond the treaty's limits, because the United States is so
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concerned with legality; the United States realizes that Russia still considers the
ABM Treaty to be legitimate. This gives Russia time to get its house in order,
while at the same time actually getting access to U.S. funds, technology, and
intelligence resources as the United States tries to persuade Russia that
participation in a global protection system would be to its benefit. With very
little effort Russia can receive enormous benefits while allowing the United States
to 'bare its soul" in its eagerness to win a new friend. Once Russia is back on its
feet, the United States may suddenly realize that it has bared more than its soul,
to the detriment of its own security.
The ABM Treaty's future depends on the status of the U.S.-Russian
relationship and the resultant BMD policy decisions. The United States has
apparently underscored its willingness to remain within the ABM Treaty by
changing the emphasis of BMD research and development to theater-level
defenses. The proposal for a GPS was in part intended to revise the basis of the
U.S.-Russian relationship to one based on cooperative, strategic defensive missions
rather than one based on offensive strategic weapons. Discussions about a GPS
system may continue but more as an exploration of confidence-building measures
than a program for operational deployment. Considering the prominence of law
in American strategic culture, it is unlikely that the United States will unilaterally
abrogate the Treaty unless an unmistakable threat to U.S. national security arises.
Russia has linked compliance with START I and 11 to U.S. compliance with
the ABM Treaty. Russia is relying on diplomatic measures to retain the
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appearance of power on the international scene. Moscow is unlikely to
renegotiate the Treaty if it perceives itself to be in a position of weakness.
Russia's domestic situation clearly does not give BMD as a whole very high
priority, but the ABM Treaty is considered important for its political image. Once
Russia's political and economic situation improves, it may more vigorously
pursue the development of a GPS-type system in order to gain a larger and more
legitimate global role and reestablish its international status. Rather than a
cooperative GPS-type arrangement, however, a future Russia might revert to
Muscovite traditions of autocracy and expansionism; it might then pursue
unilateral measures in BMID and other military capabilities that would be
damaging to the security of other nations, including the United States.
If strategic BMD deployments beyond those allowed by the 1974 protocol
to the ABM Treaty are to be made, the ABM Treaty must be changed or
abrogated. The possible receptivity of Russia in various circumstances to
amending the ABM Treaty to permit various types of expanded deployments,
including ground- or space-based, remains highly dependent on the course of
domestic politics in Russia. Some elite circles in Russia, particularly supporters
of Yeltsin in the scientific community, might be more open to transferring BMD
technology, sharing early warning data, and participating in a global protective
system. The current trend in Russian elite circles seems to be one of growing
caution about such cooperation with the United States.
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